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I. INTRODUCTION 
The freedom of individuals and enterprises to engage in economic activity, to 
enjoy freedom of contract and to compete freely in the market is protected 
as an EU fundamental right, under Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the EU, which states that 'the freedom to conduct a business in 
accordance with Union law and national laws and practices is recognised'. 
The inclusion of the freedom to conduct business as a fundamental right 
guaranteed by the Charter, entails its recognition not only as a legal right, but 
as a legal right which reflects a moral concern.1  
This article will investigate what that moral concern might be. What morally 
relevant interest is the EU seeking to protect when recognising the freedom 
to conduct business as a fundamental legal right? The obvious answer, I 
suggest, is freedom – the freedom of those who may wish to conduct business. 
However, freedom is an ambiguous and controversial moral concept. In this 
article, I will begin in Section II by contrasting two understandings of the 
concept of freedom: freedom as non-interference and freedom as non-
domination. I will then argue in Section III that the text of Article 16, and 
the caselaw of the CJEU, until recently, can be seen as compatible with an 
                                                 
1 As Besson puts it 'legal human rights are fundamental and general moral interests 
recognised by the law as sufficiently important to generate moral duties'. Similarly, 
Habermas stipulates that 'human rights circumscribe precisely that part (and only 
that part) of morality which can be translated into the medium of coercive law'. So 
there is an irreducible connection between human rights as moral concerns and 
human rights as legal norms. As Forst emphasises, 'human rights have a moral life, 
expressing urgent human concerns and claims that must not be violated or ignored 
[…and] they also have a legal life' (S. Besson, 'Human rights and democracy in a global 
context: decoupling and recoupling' (2011) 4 Ethics & Global Politics 19, 25; J. 
Habermas, 'The concept of human dignity and the realistic Utopia of human rights' 
(2010) 41 Metaphilosophy 464, 470 and R. Forst, 'The Justification of Human Rights 
and the Basic Right to Justification: A Reflexive Approach' (2010) Ethics, 711). 
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understanding of freedom as non-domination. However, in Section IV, I will 
show how the case of Alemo-Herron and associated developments, appear to 
indicate an interpretation of the right to conduct business as protecting 
freedom understood as non-interference.  
These developments, while appearing to uphold freedom, if we conceive of 
freedom as non-interference, may also be seen as diminishing freedom, if we 
conceive of freedom as non-domination. I will conclude by arguing that these 
developments can be seen as depriving the national polity of the freedom to 
regulate their collective life together by democratic means, and of the 
possibility for the national polity to protect the freedom of its members from 
being dominated by others. 
II. FREEDOM AS NON-INTERFERENCE OR AS NON-DOMINATION? 
There is an understanding of freedom, which can be termed 'freedom as non-
interference', which has been a very influential in Western political thought. 
It has been most elegantly articulated by Isaiah Berlin.2 For Berlin, social and 
political freedom entails 'the absence of obstacles to choices and activities' 
which may be open to a person.3 A person's is free, in regard to any salient area 
of activity, when she or he has a number of options open to her or him, and 
that person's freedom is diminished whenever other persons interfere with 
her or his possibility to choose one of those options The mere fact that the 
person does not have the opportunity or capacity to do something does not 
                                                 
2 See in particular I. Berlin 'Two Concepts of Liberty' in I. Berlin, and H. Hardy, (eds), 
Liberty: Incorporating Four Essays on Liberty (OUP 2002). 
3 ibid 32. In the original essay Berlin stated that freedom entails non-interference with 
an individual's ability to choose according to her or his desires (ibid 128). However, 
Berlin later recognised that this was an error – a person is deprived of freedom not 
only when she is precluded from choosing something that she actually desires, but 
also when the number of options open to her are reduced. As Berlin acknowledges, 'if 
freedom is simply not to be prevented by other persons from doing whatever one 
wishes, then one way of attaining such freedom is by extinguishing one's wishes' (I 
Berlin 'Introduction' in I. Berlin, and H. Hardy (eds), Liberty: Incorporating Four Essays 
on Liberty (OUP 2002), 31).  
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diminish her or his freedom.4 According to Berlin it is only 'if I am prevented 
by others from doing what I could otherwise do, I am to that degree unfree'.5 
This is not the only possible understanding of freedom.6 Phillip Pettit has 
criticized it as inadequate on two grounds. First, because it fails to 
acknowledge that there can be a diminution of freedom even in the absence 
of interference, and second, because it fails to recognize that not all 
interferences with an individual's ability to choose entails a diminution of 
freedom.7 I will elaborate this criticism and present Pettit's own 
understanding of freedom. 
1. Loss of Freedom without Interference 
Freedom as non-interference is a product of the choices open to an 
individual. Berlin uses the metaphor of open doors – an individual is free to 
the extent that there are a number of possible doors that are open to her or 
him, and to the extent that those doors are free from obstacles. So on this 
view, if person B is able to choose between option x, y and z in respect of some 
important aspect of her life,8 then B is free to that extent. Her freedom is 
reduced when someone interferes with her ability to choose one or more of 
                                                 
4 It is only 'the part that I believe to be played by other human beings, directly or 
indirectly, with or without the intention of doing so, in frustrating my wishes' which 
makes me unfree (ibid 176). 
5 ibid 169 (emphasis added). 
6 In fact, Berlin presents, as the title of the essay suggests, two concepts of 'liberty': 
negative liberty, which he conceives as non-interference, and 'positive liberty' which 
he equates with the possibility of self-realisation of the individual's true self. Berlin 
emphasises that this concept of 'liberty' negates the possibility of individual freedom 
and is irreconcilable with a notion of freedom as non-interference. So for Berlin, only 
negative liberty can be called 'freedom'. I do not take issue with Berlin in his claim 
that 'positive liberty' cannot be equated with freedom. I will however argue that 
Berlin presents a false dichotomy, because 'negative liberty' can itself be conceived as 
'freedom as non-interference' and 'freedom as non-domination'. 
7 The seminal work is Pettit Republicanism: A theory of freedom and government (OUP 
1999). See also Pettit 'Republican Freedom: Three axioms, four theorems' in C. 
Laborde and J. Maynor (eds.) Republicanism and Political Theory (Blackwell 2008).  
8 Freedom is thus a function of my ability to choose in respect of matters that 'are 
important in my plan of life, given my character and circumstances' (Berlin (n 2), 177)  
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those options, by preventing, or making more difficult for her to choose that 
option or options. 
Pettit argues that this fails to account for the possibility that freedom can also 
be reduced in situations where there is no interference with the actual 
choices which are available to a person. He therefore proposes a different 
conception of freedom, which builds on the republican tradition of political 
thought,9 and which he terms 'freedom as non-domination'. Under this 
conception, freedom is diminished not only by actual interference, but also 
by domination. Domination entails the possibility of one person (or group, or 
institution) exercising control over the choices of another – when one person 
has 'alien control'10 over another. So freedom is not only compromised when 
person A interferes with the choices open to person B, but also when person 
A is able to control the choices which B makes, even if no actual interference 
occurs.11  
According to the concept of freedom as non-interference, the existence of 
such relationships of dominance has no impact on freedom if those who are 
in a position to exercise 'alien control' refrain from interfering with the 
choices open to those whom they dominate. So according to Berlin 'liberty is 
not incompatible with some kinds of autocracy' and 'it is perfectly possible 
that a liberal minded despot will allow his subjects a large measure of […] 
freedom'.12 By contrast, where freedom is conceived as non-domination, it is 
                                                 
9 It should be noted that Pettit himself does not claim that the conception of freedom 
as non-domination is his own original idea, but is his articulation of 'an ideal which 
has deep roots in the history of thought' and reflects a tradition that goes back to 'at 
least to the Roman republican way of thinking about freedom, and survived though 
the Renaissance and the English republic […] to become a centerpiece of political 
thought in the 18th century' (Pettit 'The Instability of Freedom as Noninterference: 
The Case of Isaiah Berlin' (2011) 121 Ethics 693, 708).  
10 According to Pettit, 'alien control' arises where A has desires over how B choses, A 
acts on those desires, A's action or presence makes a desired difference to how B 
chooses. So there is an element of intentionality to alien control, on the part of A – A 
has to want B to choose in a particular way (Pettit Republicanism, 22 ff and Pettit 
'Three Axioms', 102 (both n 7)). 
11 Pettit suggests that alien control may be exercised through invigilation – A is able to 
invigilate the choices which B makes (Pettit 'Three Axioms' (n 7)). 
12 Berlin (n 2), 176. 
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wholly incompatible with subjugation to a despot, because while such a 
despot 'might allow his subjects free choice', she or he will nonetheless always 
be in a position to exercise invigilation and control over how those subjects 
choose. Domination is thus a function of unequal power between such 
persons or groups.13 
So, as Pettit argues, a conception of freedom as non-interference is 
incomplete. It fails to account for those circumstances were the freedom of 
persons is diminished not by any interference in the choices that they make, 
but by the existence of relations of domination – relations where one person, 
or group, is able to exercise oversight and control over the choices made by 
other persons.14 In freedom as non-domination, therefore, the focus shifts 
from the extent to which a person's choices are restricted to the extent to 
which a person is subject to the control of other persons in the making of 
choices – in other words, the focus shifts from the freedom of choices and the 
notion of a free person as one who has free choices, to the freedom of person 
and the notion of a free choice as one which is made by a free person.15  
2. Interference without Loss of Freedom 
The incompleteness of the conception of freedom as non-interference is 
double-edged. Not only does this conception miss those situations where 
there is loss of freedom without interference, but it assumes that all 
interferences with the ability of individuals to choose amount to a restriction 
of that individual's freedom. However, if we conceive of freedom as non-
domination we can see that there can be interferences in the choices of 
                                                 
13 C. Laborde 'Republicanism in M. Freeden and M. Stears (eds) Oxford Handbook of 
Political Ideologies (OUP 2013).  
14 Pettit points out that Berlin's conception of freedom would count as free a person 
(B), who is subject to the control of another (A), in respect of the choice between X 
and Y, where B is able to ingratiate himself to A so that A will not interfere with B's 
choice. In this scenario, it appears that the freedom of B to choose between X and Y 
has not been interfered with, because B was able to persuade A (who could have 
interfered) not to interfere. But as Pettit points out 'you cannot make yourself free 
[where freedom is understood as non-domination] by cozying up to the powerful and 
keeping them sweet' (Pettit (n 9), 705). 
15 Pettit 'Free Persons and Free Choices' (2007) 28 History of Political Thought 709. 
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individuals which do not entail a loss of freedom, because they do not entail a 
domination of one person by another.  
The mechanism which allows for such interference without domination is 
democratic control. Where a law is enacted in a manner which allows those 
subject to the law to exercise control over it16 and where laws 'are forced to 
track the perceived interests of those on whom they are imposed'17 then those 
subject to the law are not subject to domination by any one person or group 
– they are not subject to arbitrary rule by another.18  
The person subject to that law may find that the choices open to her have 
been diminished. We can use as an example a law that prohibits driving over 
50 km/h in a built-up area, which clearly interferes with the choice of a driver 
to drive over that speed. But if that law was enacted through a process in 
which that person had some measure of control, then, under the concept of 
freedom as non-domination, her freedom was not diminished by that 
restriction of her choices. The freedom of the driver to choose to drive fast is 
                                                 
16 What kind of control would suffice is a matter which goes beyond the scope of this 
paper, and thus one in which I will not go to in detail, but, following Pettit, it would 
need to more than mere causal effect, but it would not need to be intentional 
direction. (Pettit, 'Three Conceptions of Democratic Control' (2008) 15 
Constellations, 46).  
17 Pettit, 'Republican Freedom and Contestatory Democratization' in I. Shapiro and C. 
Hacker-Cardón (eds) (CUP 1999), 170. 
18 Of course, it will never be possible to demonstrate that any particular law is truly non-
arbitrary, and adequately tracks the interests of those over whom it claims authority. 
Pettit emphasises that the most important element of democratic control is the 
ability of those who are subject to the law to contest that law (Pettit, (fn 17)). This 
echoes the theory of democracy of Claude Lefort, who argues that democracy 'invites 
us to replace the notion of a legitimate law with the notion of a debate about what is 
legitimate and what is illegitimate, a debate which is necessarily without any 
guarantor and without any end' (C. Lefort 'The Question of Democracy' in Democracy 
and Political Theory (Transl. D. Macey) (Polity 1998), 39). For Lefort therefore 'it is the 
very fact that every single individual over whom that authority is claimed has the right 
to reject that claim, and denounce it as hollow and wrong, which gives any claim of 
authority democratic legitimacy.' (C. Lefort 'Human Rights and the Welfare State' 
in Democracy and Political Theory, (Transl. D. Macey) (Polity 1998), 41). 
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taken away, 19 and this is not remedied by arguing that she should not have 
chosen to drive fast. But she is not deprived of freedom, understood as non-
domination, because it is not any one person imposing their choices on her, 
but it is a rule which results from a process over which the driver herself had 
a measure of control. What prevents the restriction on the driver's freedom 
of choice from being dominating is not that it was 'correct' but that it was 
imposed by a process over which the driver had control, so it was not the 
imposition of an alien will on her. 
3. The Value of Civic Freedom 
Where we conceive of freedom of as non-domination, we can see that it is 
possible for law to restrict choices without thereby diminishing freedom. But 
its effect goes further. The introduction of laws which restrict the freedom 
of choice of persons can have the effect of protecting others from 
domination. If freedom is diminished by the presence of relations of 
domination, where one individual or group has the power to exercise 'alien 
control' over others, then it is possible for the introduction of a law which 
restricts the freedom of choice of those who may have such dominance 
increases the freedom of all those who may otherwise be subject to that 
domination. 
So setting aside such laws in order to allow individuals to choose that which 
those laws prohibit does not necessarily result in an increase in freedom. 
First, as set out above, such laws will not be a restriction on the freedom of its 
                                                 
19 And here it may be helpful to distinguish again 'freedom as non-domination' from 
Berlin's conception of positive liberty, discussed in footnote 6 above. Under the 
conception of positive liberty, the argument would be that the driver's liberty had not 
been diminished because her liberty as a rational individual would not be increased 
by giving way to irrational desire of driving fast: If A was truly free she would see that 
she should not desire to drive fast, and so would exercise self-mastery over her desires. 
As Berlin points out, such an understanding of liberty is incompatible with individual 
freedom and carries with it totalizing forces ('it is the argument of every dictator, 
inquisitor and bully'). But that is not what is meant by freedom as non-domination. 
The freedom of the driver to choose to drive fast is taken away, and this is not 
remedied by arguing that she should not have chosen to drive fast. 
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addressees, if they are non-dominating.20 And, second, those laws may in 
themselves be protective of freedom. 
If individual members of the community are able to arbitrarily disregard the 
rules by which that community regulates its life together, and thereby 
exercise domination over other members of the community, then no member 
of that community is able to consider her or himself as a free person.21 As 
Pettit puts it: 
Freedom involves emancipation from […] subordination, liberation from […] 
dependency. It requires the capacity to stand eye to eye with your fellow 
citizens, in a shared awareness that none of you has a power of arbitrary 
interference over another.22 
Under the republican conception of freedom advanced by Pettit, rules which 
the political community agree on, through a process over which members of 
that community have some control, do not deprive individuals of freedom, 
even when they restrict the choices available to them. On the contrary, such 
rules are necessary to protect freedom, because they can restrict the 
possibility that some members of that community will dominate others.23 
                                                 
20 This is not to say that laws promulgated by the state cannot themselves be a source of 
domination. As Pettit puts it 'The republican state must not only seek to combat the 
effects of dominium in giving rise to domination, it must also guard against the 
domination that can be associated with the imperium of government' (Pettit 
Republicanism (n 7) 173). And the state, by being inescapable, and by being able to 
exercise violent coercion to ensure compliance with its rules, is itself 'a serious threat 
to people's enjoyment of [freedom as non-domination]' (Pettit (n 7), 155). So the thesis 
advanced here is not that state rules are per-se non-dominant. However, republican 
political theory presupposes that some degree of non-domination is possible through 
the institution of democratic processes, by which those whose freedom of choice is 
limited by common rules are able to exercise a measure of control over those rules. 
21 It is possible that persons who exercise domination over others may consider 
themselves free. But if there are no institutional protections against domination, then 
such persons are not necessarily free from domination, because there may be others 
who will, in other circumstances, have the upper hand and thereby dominate them. If 
there are no protections against arbitrary power, then what may appear as freedom is 
wholly contingent, and the dominator may find himself the dominated.  
22 Pettit Republicanism (n 7) 5. 
23 And this is an indication that understanding freedom as non-domination also entails 
the protection of basic rights. To be able to live as a free person, in a society where 
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Further, under this conception of freedom, a person is free to the extent that 
she or he lives in a community in which she or he is able to exercise control 
over the rules which coerce her or him, so setting aside those rules will 
diminish the freedom of all the persons living in that community.  
III. THE EU RIGHT TO CONDUCT BUSINESS AS A REPUBLICAN 
FREEDOM 
Article 16 of the Charter states that 'the freedom to conduct a business in 
accordance with Union law and national laws and practices is recognised'.24  
I argue that, by tying the freedom to conduct business to 'Union law and 
national laws and practices', the EU is recognizing the freedom to conduct 
business as non-domination, rather than as non-interference. This means 
that, under Article 16, persons do not have a general right to be free from 
interference in their choices when conducting their business. They have a 
right to conduct their business to the extent that the law allows them. This 
may seem a tautology: 'I am allowed by law to do that which the law allows me 
to do'. But it is not a tautology, because the fact that the Charter recognizes 
that I have the freedom to conduct business in accordance with the law 
means that I have a legally enforceable right to do so, and I am therefore 
                                                 
one is not subjected to domination by others, entails the institutionalization of a set 
of basic rights which will protect the person both from dominium, that is by being 
subject to alien control by other persons, and from imperium, that is, to being subject 
to arbitrary rule by the state (see Pettit 'The Basic Liberties' in M. Kramer et al (eds) 
The Legacy of H.L.A. Hart: Legal, Political and Moral Philosophy (OUP, 2008). But such 
basic liberties, being themselves legal rights, must themselves be the outcome of 
democratic processes (see J. Waldron 'A Right-Based Critique of Constitutional 
Rights' (1993) 13 OJLS 18. It should be noted that there are important differences 
between republican theorists on the extent to which basic rights should be 
entrenched in a constitution and enforced by courts. For an overview of the debate 
between different approaches in the republican 'camp' see T. Hickey 'The 
Republican Virtues of the "New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism"' 
(2016) 14 Icon 494. 
24 The Explanations to the Charter indicate that this entails the recognition of the 
freedom to exercise an economic or commercial activity, freedom of contract and 
free competition. (Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
[2007] OJ C303/02). Article 6(1) TEU states that these explanations are to be given 
due regard to in interpreting and applying the Charter.  
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entitled to challenge before a court25 any measure which precludes me from 
doing that which the law allows me to do.26 
This understanding of freedom to conduct business is perfectly consonant 
with freedom as non-domination. If the political community (the EU or the 
member states) has regulated a particular area of economic activity, then this 
will not restrict the freedom of the economic actors engaged in that activity, 
even if it may interfere with some of the choices that would otherwise be 
open to them.27  
By contrast, if the economic activity is allowed by the relevant laws, then any 
restriction on that activity will amount to alien control. So if the EU or the 
member states, or any other body, seeks to prevent a person from conducting 
their business, where that person's conduct is in accordance with Union law 
and national laws and practices, then that could amount to alien control over 
that person. 
                                                 
25 Either the CJEU or in the national courts, depending on the measure that causes the 
interference. 
26 Article 16 thus allows individuals to challenge before a court any arbitrary 
interference with their freedom to conduct business. Such an arbitrary interference 
may of course be challengeable on other grounds, such as ultra vires or abuse of power, 
but Article 16 makes sure that a ground for challenge will exist. As the Court held in 
Kadi 'the Community judicature must […] ensure the review, in principle the full 
review, of the lawfulness of all Community acts in the light of the fundamental rights' 
(Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and another v Council 
ECLI:EU:C:2008:461, para. 326). It should be noted that this obligation extends to 
national measures implementing EU law, as set out in Article 51 of the Charter. 
27 This presupposes that the law in question is made through a process over which those 
affected have some control over. I will not address whether in reality this is the case, 
but if a person considers that a law is made in a way which does not take her or his 
interest into account, then that itself will be the ground for challenging that law, not 
the interference with freedom. However, this takes us into questions relating to a 
theory of democracy which are outside the scope of this article. (for a theory of 
democratic contestation that would be compatible with freedom as non-domination 
see J. Hart Ely Democracy and Distrust (Harvard U.P.; 1980). For an application in the 
European context, see E. Gill-Pedro EU Fundamental Rights and National Democracies: 
Contradictory or Complementary (Doctoral Dissertation, Lund, 2016). 
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1. The CJEU's Case Law 
The case law of the CJEU is particularly relevant in the context of this right, 
because in the Explanations to the Charter relating to Article 16, it is stated 
that 'this right is based on the case law of the CJEU'.28 The Explanations 
provide examples of cases where this right was recognised, and in order to 
understand how this right is conceived within the EU legal order, we need to 
look at that caselaw. I will seek to show that this case law is, until quite 
recently, consonant with an understanding of freedom as non-domination. 
The first case mentioned in the Explanations is Nold.29 This case concerned 
EU measures which sought to rationalize coal production and distribution, 
and therefore imposed conditions which meant that the applicant, a 
company engaged in the selling and distribution of coal, but who did not meet 
those conditions, could not act as a direct wholesaler of coal. The applicant 
challenged the EU measures before the CJEU, on the grounds inter alia that 
it breached its fundamental right to the free pursuit of its business activities,30 
because the measures 'have the effect, by depriving it of direct supplies, of 
jeopardising both the profitability of the undertaking and the free 
development of its business activity, to the point of endangering its very 
existence'.31 
The CJEU did not accept the applicant's arguments. Instead it stated: 
                                                 
28 This right is absent from the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and 
from other Council of Europe instruments, such as the European Social Charter. It 
is also absent from other major international human rights instruments, such as the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the UN Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, the UN Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights. 
29 Case 4/73 J. Nold, Kohlen- und Baustoffgroßhandlung v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1974:51, 
491. 
30 The only explicit provision cited by the applicant in this context was 'the right of 
property ownership, the protection of which is ensured in particular by Article 14 of 
the 'Grundgesetz' of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Constitution of the 
Land of Hesse'. (ibid Submissions and Arguments of the Parties, Section III.B.4.). In 
addition, the applicant claimed that 'These rights are also recognized by the 
Constitutions of other Member States of the Community, by international 
Conventions' (ibid, Conclusions of the Parties, Section IV). No citations to such 
provisions in other Constitutions or Conventions appears to have been provided. 
31 ibid para. 12 of the Grounds. 
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If rights of ownership are protected by the constitutional laws of all the 
Member States and if similar guarantees are given in respect of their right 
freely to choose and practice their trade or profession, the rights thereby 
guaranteed, far from constituting unfettered prerogatives, must be viewed in 
the light of the social function of the property and activities protected 
thereunder.32 
So the CJEU states that, if such a right were to be protected, it would not be 
absolute but could be limited. However, the CJEU does not then consider 
whether the measure could be justified as a limitation on the applicant's 
rights. Instead, in a final twist, it turns at last to the question of whether the 
measure fell within the scope of fundamental rights. It states: 
As regards the guarantees accorded to a particular undertaking, they can in 
no respect be extended to protect mere commercial interests or 
opportunities, the uncertainties of which are part of the very essence of 
economic activity.33 
So in the end the CJEU concludes this measure, in restricting the economic 
opportunities of undertakings participating in the internal market, do not fall 
within the scope of a putative 'right to conduct a business', if such a right were 
to be guaranteed. 
This rejection of the claim that that the freedom to conduct business extends 
to measures that limit the 'commercial interests of opportunities' – measures 
which interfere with the freedom of choice of economic operators – indicates 
that the CJEU did not approach the freedom to conduct business as freedom 
as non-interference. Because under such a conception of freedom, the 
Commission's decision34 had clearly interfered with the choices open to the 
applicant. 
Nold is presented as a 'founding stone' in the emergence of the right to 
conduct business as an EU fundamental right. The Explanations state that 
'Article 16 is based on CJEU case law which has recognised freedom to 
                                                 
32 ibid para. 14 (emphasis is mine). 
33 ibid para. 14. 
34 The Commission's Decision introduced new terms of business which the 
Commission knew meant that a number of coal dealers would lose their entitlement 
to buy directly from the producer – the Decision interfered with the freedom of those 
dealers to choose to buy directly from the producer. 
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exercise an economic or commercial activity' and cites Nold.35 This case is 
presented as 'a source for later case law' 36 and indeed is cited extensively by 
the CJEU. Dean Spielmann, former judge of the CJEU and writing as part of 
an EU Network of Experts, explicitly acknowledges the right to conduct 
business as founded on the CJEU's case law: 
La liberté d'entreprise n'est pas prévue dans les autres conventions 
internationales. Elle n'est pas reconnue dans la Convention européenne des 
droits de l'homme […] [Elle] se fonde sur la jurisprudence de la Cour de 
justice.37  
So when seeking to understand the meaning and scope of the EU 
fundamental right to conduct business, this case is of central importance. 
And if we consider Nold, and all the case law which followed it, alongside all 
the cases concerning the right to conduct business decided by the CJEU prior 
to the Charter coming into force, I identify three characteristics. First, all 
                                                 
35 Together with Spa Eridiania. But in that case, again the CJEU does not 'recognise' a 
right to conduct business, but merely observes that 'an undertaking cannot claim a 
vested right to the maintenance of an advantage which it obtained from the 
establishment of the common organization of the market and which it enjoyed at a 
given time', and that therefore a national decree which altered the applicant's quota 
allocation (implementing a EU Regulation) did not breach the applicant's 
fundamental rights. As in Nold, the CJEU merely repeats someone else's claim that 
this right exist, without taking a view on whether it does so: 'That guarantee is said to 
extend to the rights of undertakings […]' (Case 230/78 SpA Eridania-Zuccherifici 
nazionali and another v Minister of Agriculture and Forestry and another, 
ECLI:EU:C:1979:216, paras 22 and 20 respectively, emphasis is mine). 
36 J. Cunha Rodriges, 'Internationale Handelsgesellschaft and Nold' in Maduro M and 
Azoulai L (eds), The Past and Future of EU Law (Hart 2010), 93. Oliver states that 
CJEU ruled in Nold that the right to conduct business was recognised as an EU 
fundamental right, and subsequent cases confirmed this ruling (Oliver, 'What 
purpose does Article 16 of the Charter serve?' in U. Bernitz, X. Groussot and F. 
Schulyok (eds), General Principles of EU Law and European Private Law (Kluwer 2013), 
283. 
37 D. Spielmann Liberté d'entreprise in EU Network of Experts on Fundamental Rights 
(eds) Commentary on the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (EC Commission, June 
2016),at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamentalrights/files 
/networkcommentaryfinal_en.pdf, accessed at 21 September 2016.  
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these cases entail challenges brought against EU measures. Persons38 who 
considered that their freedom of economic action was constrained by EU 
measures challenged those measures, either directly in the CJEU,39 or 
indirectly through the national courts and by way of preliminary reference.40  
Second, in all these cases in which individuals sought to rely on their right to 
conduct business in order to challenge EU measures, the Court has rejected 
their challenge.41 
Third, the approach of the Court appears to follow the same pattern in every 
case – the Court will adopt a very deferential attitude to the EU institution 
that adopted the measure.42 The focus is on the EU measure and on the 
objectives which that measure is intended to achieve, rather than on the 
interference with the choices open to the persons claiming that their right 
                                                 
38 Mostly legal persons. In some cases the proceedings were brought by member states 
though the rights claimed to be infringed were those of persons (e.g. Case C-240/97 
Spain v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1999:479 and Joined Cases C-184/02 and C-223/02 
Spain and Finland v European Parliament and Council, ECLI:EU:C:2004:497), and some 
cases entail natural persons (e.g. Case 44/79 Liselotte Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfal,z 
ECLI:EU:C:1979:290). 
39 As in Nold (n 29). 
40 As in Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für 
Getreide und Futtermittel, ECLI:EU:C:1970:114. 
41 This point is made by both Oliver and Usai, who both conduct an overview of the 
relevant caselaw (Oliver (n 36); A. Usai 'The Freedom to Conduct a Business in the 
EU, Its Limitations and Its Role in the European Legal Order' (2013) 14 German Law 
Journal, 1867). Weatherill also states that 'Article 16 of the Charter does not disallow 
a broad range of interventions by public authorities which limit the exercise of 
economic activities, provided only that the public interest behind the intervention is 
adequately demonstrated' (S. Weatherill 'Use and Abuse of the EU's Charter of 
Fundamental Rights: on the improper veneration of "freedom of contract"' (2014) 10 
European Review of Contract Law 167, 178). 
42 In his very critical overview of the caselaw, Carsten Herresthal observes that 'the 
[Court] grants the EU […] a very wide range of discretion in choosing measures of 
intervention' (C. Herresthal 'Constitutionalisation of Freedom of Contract Law' in 
K. Ziegler, and Huber Current Problems in the Protection of Human Rights (Hart 2013), 
112).  
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had been interfered.43 So while the Court stated, in Spain v Commission44 that 
'the freedom [to conduct business]45 cannot, therefore, be limited in the 
absence of Community rules imposing specific restrictions in that regard' 
whenever the Community rules impose specific restrictions on that choices 
open to particular economic actors, the Court will not set aside those in order 
to protect the freedom of choice of those actors. As Groussot et al. put it, the 
Court: 
Confine[s] itself to examining whether [the EU measure] contains a manifest 
error or constitutes a misuse of power or whether the authority in question 
did not clearly exceed the bounds of its discretion46 
This is consonant with the text of Article 16 – the right to conduct business, 
in accordance with Union law, is guaranteed. This was expressly affirmed by the 
Court in Sky Österreich, a case that was decided after the Charter had come 
into force, and where the Court (sitting as a Grand Chamber) reviewed its 
own case law and stated that: 
On the basis of that case-law and in the light of the wording of Article 16 of 
the Charter, […] the freedom to conduct a business may be subject to a broad 
                                                 
43 The case of Hauer (n 38) is particularly striking in that respect. The applicant was the 
owner of a plot of land, and she wished to plant vines on that land in order to produce 
and sell wine. However, an EU Regulation prohibited all new planting of vines for 
wine producing in her area, so she was absolutely precluded from engaging in the 
occupation of wine producer. The Court held that this prohibition did not necessary 
engage Ms Hauer's right to conduct business - and in any event was justified and 
necessary ('the restriction on the free pursuit of the occupation of wine grower, 
assuming it exists, is justified'). 
44 Spain v. Commission (n 38) para. 99.  
45 This case concerned the freedom of contract of one of the parties. Freedom of 
contract is recognized as one aspect of the freedom to conduct business under Article 
16 of the Charter, according to the Explanations to the Charter (together with the 
freedom of economic activity and the right to free competition.  
46 X. Groussot, G.T. Pétursson and and J Pierce 'Weak Right, Strong Court – The 
Freedom to Conduct Business and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights' (2014) 
Lund University Legal Research Paper 01/2014, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=2428181, accessed 21 September 2016, 11. 
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range of interventions on the part of public authorities which may limit the 
exercise of economic activity in the public interest.47 
I suggest that the case law of the court regarding the right to conduct business 
can be interpreted as holding that, in situations where the Union rules permit 
a particular activity, the person has a right to conduct it. But if Union rules do 
restrict that activity, there is no right to conduct it. It is also consonant with 
an understanding of freedom as non-domination. The freedom of economic 
operators means that they have a right to do that which the law allows them, 
and not to be subject to arbitrary, dominant, impositions on their action. But 
the freedom of economic operators does not mean that they have a right to 
do what they choose to do. Their freedom of choice is protected only to the 
extent that they may choose that which the law allows them to choose.  
2. Freedom from National Regulation 
As set out above, in the case law prior to the Charter coming into force, the 
freedom to conduct business had only been invoked in order to challenge 
(unsuccessfully) EU law measures. Groussot et al. speculate that this 'weak' 
right might be transformed by a 'strong' court. They note that the inclusion 
of this right in the Charter imbues this right with a 'constitutional flavour'48 
emboldening the CJEU to allow this right to be invoked by individuals 
challenging national measures within the scope of EU law. 
In Scarlet Extended49 the Court did just that. In this case, a management 
company, representing copyright holders (SABAM), brought proceedings in 
a national court against an internet service provider (Scarlet Extended) 
because clients of Scarlet were accessing the internet to download works 
from SABAM's catalogue without paying. In the national proceedings, 
SABAN applied for an injunction requiring that Scarlet install filters in its 
servers in order to monitor and block any users which were unlawfully sharing 
works in SABAM's catalogue. Directive 2000/31/EC50 prohibits national 
                                                 
47 Case C-283/11 Sky Österreich GmbH v Österreichischer Rundfunk, ECLI:EU:C:2013:28, 
para. 46. 
48 Groussot et al (n 46) 4. 
49 Case C-70/10 Scarlet Extended SA v SABAM, ECLI:EU:C:2011:771. 
50 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 
on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic 
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authorities from imposing a general obligation on an ISP to monitor and 
record the information it transmits on its network, so the national court 
submitted a reference asking whether granting that injunction would 
contravene that prohibition, read in light of Articles 8 (right to respect for 
private life) and 10 (freedom of expression) ECHR.51  
The Court found that granting the injunction would not be compatible with 
EU law. But in its reasoning, the Court did not focus on the Directive, nor to 
the right of free expression and the right to privacy. Instead it rephrased the 
question, to refer not to 'article 8 and 10 ECHR' but to 'applicable 
fundamental rights'. It then rephrased the Grand Chamber judgement of 
Promusicae, which had stated that 'the right to respect for private life on the one 
hand and the rights to protection of property and to an effective remedy on 
the other' need to be balanced,52 by holding that this meant that 'the 
protection of the fundamental right to property, which includes the rights 
linked to intellectual property, must be balanced against the protection of 
other fundamental rights'.53 It then concluded that it followed from Promusicae 
that, in circumstances such as in the main proceedings, the national court 
must: 
strike a fair balance between the protection of the intellectual property right 
enjoyed by copyright holders and that of the freedom to conduct a business 
enjoyed by operators such as ISPs pursuant to Article 16 of the Charter54 
The application of Article 16 in respect of national measures, and in 
proceedings between private persons, was a significant extension of the scope 
of Article 16. As Everson and Gonçalves suggest, this case: 
                                                 
commerce, in the Internal Market ('Directive on electronic commerce') [2000] OJ 
L178/01. 
51 Respectively, the right to respect for private life and the right to free expression. 
52 Case C-275/06 Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) v Telefónica de España, 
ECLI:EU:C:2008:54, para. 65 (emphasis added) 
53 ibid (emphasis added). 
54 Scarlet Extended (n 49) para. 46. 
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both de facto and de jure elevates the principle of the freedom to conduct 
business to a private obligation – or 'quasi-subjective' right – that must be 
enforced by national law between private individuals.55 
But when it comes to the substance of Article 16, the Court follows the pre-
Charter approach. Article 16 only protects the freedom to conduct business 
to the extent to which such freedom is allowed by EU and national law. The 
injunction which SABAM applied for was not allowed by the Directive, 56 and 
it would contravene the rights of free expression and of privacy of the internet 
users. 57 Which means that the injunction would prohibit Scarlet Extended 
from doing something which, under the Directive (interpreted in light of the 
rights of free expression and privacy) Scarlet Extended had a right to do. As I 
have sought to demonstrate, in the review of the case law set out above, the 
right to conduct business protects the freedom of individuals to do that 
which the law allows them to do. Therefore, an injunction which prevented 
Scarlet Extended from conducting their business in a manner which was 
allowed by law would constitute an arbitrary interference with the company's 
'right to conduct business in accordance with EU law and national law and 
practice'.58 
Scarlet Extended, while a significant case59 in that it extended the application 
of Article 16 to national measures, can thus be understood as a continuation 
                                                 
55 M. Everson and R. C. Gonçalves, 'Art 16 - Freedom to Conduct Business' in S Peers 
and others (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: a Commentary (Hart 2014), 451. 
56 The granting of the injunction would clearly be a 'general obligation' prohibited by 
the Directive. See Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón in Case C-70/10 Scarlet Extended SA 
v SABAM, ECLI:EU:C:2011:255, para. 66. 
57 AG Cruz Villalón pointed to the very far reaching consequences of the national 
proceedings 'The outcome of the main action is undeniably intended to be extended 
and generalised not only to all ISPs but also and more widely to other important 
internet participants, not only in the Member State from which the questions have 
been referred for a preliminary ruling, but also to all Member States, and even 
beyond.' (para 61). Further, in the earlier case of Promusicae, cited by the CJEU in 
Scarlet Extended, the Grand Chamber had already emphasised the importance of the 
right to respect for private life in the context of internet service providers. 
58 Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. 
59 This case was followed shortly after by Case C-360/10 SABAM v Netlog N,V 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:85, with very similar facts, where the court applied the reasoning of 
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of the pre-Charter approach, where the right to conduct business protects 
freedom as non-domination, rather than freedom as non-interference. 
IV. TRANSFORMING THE RIGHT TO CONDUCT BUSINESS 
Shortly before the Charter came into force, Andrea Usai proposed60 that 
Article 16 should be used to 'push the throttle in favour of an even more 
developed economic union' by allowing the right to conduct business to be 
used as a 'safeguard against barriers that the member states may want to put 
up in the internal market'61 even in purely internal situations.62 Usai thus 
presents the normative value of the right to conduct business as flowing from 
the way it preserves and promotes the possibility for individuals to be able to 
be free from constraints – constraints in the way they conduct their business 
or on the way they structure their contractual relationships.  
Under this understanding, freedom from regulation is presented as a value in 
itself. In other words, the ability of individuals to determine their actions and 
structure their relationships independently from public intervention,63 and 
to insulate those persons from regulation or coercion is presented as 
normatively valuable in itself.64 
Of course, this freedom is not presented as absolute, and interferences with 
the economic freedom of individuals by both EU and by the member states 
are permissible.65 But any such interference, either by the EU or by the 
                                                 
Scarlet almost verbatim (compare Scarlet Extended, paras 41 – 49 with Netlog paras 39-
47). 
60 Usai (n 41), 1871. 
61 ibid 1881. 
62 ibid 1883. 
63 D. Leczykiewicz and S. Weatherill 'Introduction' in D. Leczykiewicz and S. 
Weatherill (eds) The Involvement of EU Law in Private Law Relationships (Hart 2013), 
3. 
64 D. Leczykiewicz 'Horizontal Effect of Fundamental Rights: In Search of Social 
Justice or Private Autonomy in EU Law?' in U. Bernitz, X. Groussot and F. Schulyok 
(eds), General Principles of EU Law and European Private Law (Kluwer Law 
International 2013), 172. 
65 Oliver suggests that the role of Article 16 should be reserved for 'extreme cases, its 
primary function being to act as a counterweight to other fundamental rights' and to 
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member states when acting in the scope of EU law, must be justified and 
proportionate, in light of an objective which is recognized as legitimate under 
EU law. The key point is that private autonomy, presented as the freedom of 
economic actors to determine their actions without interference from the 
state,66 is something which should in principle be preserved, with any 
regulatory interference on that freedom presented as something that requires 
justification. 
I argue that this understanding of the right to conduct business does not 
reflect the text of the Article 16 of the Charter and of the Explanations to the 
Charter. Nor does it reflect the case law of the Court. This understanding of 
the right to conduct business reflects a conception of freedom as non-
interference, rather than freedom as non-domination. It presupposes that 
individuals are free to the extent that their ability to choose between 
different options that could be open to them is not interfered with, and they 
are made less free whenever some choices are closed to them. 
In Alemo-Herron, it appears that the Court departed from its traditional 
understanding of the right to conduct business and adopted an approach 
which seems more in line with the approach set out in the preceding 
paragraph – an approach which seems to reflect an understanding of freedom 
as non-interference. 
1. Alemo-Herron 
The claimants in Alemo-Herron67 were former employees of the leisure 
department of a local authority (Lewisham Borough Council). The Council's 
leisure activities were sold to one private company and subsequently to the 
defendants (Parkwood Leisure, another private company). Under the 
domestic legislation, the contract of employment between the employees 
                                                 
serve as a reminder to the EU and the member states that they 'must have regard to 
[to the freedom to conduct business] in all their actions' ((Oliver (n 36) 299). 
66 Or even from interference by other private actors – Leczykiewicz considers that a 
restriction of private autonomy can occur in horizontal situations, where private 
actors interfere with the private autonomy of other private actors (Leczykiewicz (n 
64)). 
67 Case C-426/11 Mark Alemo-Herron and others v Parkwood Leisure Ltd, 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:521. 
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and the Council had been transferred to the new employers, who assumed the 
'rights, powers, duties and liabilities' under that contract. This contract 
included a provision to the effect that the terms of the employment would be 
in accordance with terms negotiated by the National Joint Council for Local 
Government Services (NJC). Parkwood did not participate in the NCJ, and 
could not do so as it was not a local authority. 
After the transfer, the NJC negotiated a new agreement, the terms of which, 
under domestic law, would become binding on Parkwood. However, 
Parkwood informed its employees that it would not be abiding by that new 
agreement. Alemo-Herron and the other employees brought proceedings in 
the Employment Tribunal. 
The domestic legislation68 implemented the Acquired Rights Directive.69 
This Directive stipulates that 'the transferee shall continue to observe the 
terms and conditions agreed in any collective agreement on the same terms 
applicable to the transferor under that agreement' until the termination of 
that agreement.70 The CJEU had already held71 that this provision should not 
be interpreted as requiring that the employer be bound not just by the 
agreements in force at the time of the transfer, but also by agreements 
concluded after that date (so called 'dynamic' clauses).72 
But the Directive stated expressly that it was without prejudice the right of 
Member States to apply or introduce laws more favourable to employees. 
This is what the domestic legislation did – it allowed 'dynamic' clauses to be 
incorporated into contracts of employment, which meant that, on transfer, 
                                                 
68 The Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 1981 (TUPE 
Regulations). 
69 Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws of 
the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of 
transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses [2001] OJ 
L 82/0016 (the Acquired Rights Directive). 
70 Acquired Rights Directive, Article 3(3). 
71 Case C-499/04 Hans Werhof v Freeway Traffic Systems GmbH & Co. KG, 
ECLI:EU:C:2006:168. 
72 Article 3(1) of the Directive must be interpreted as not precluding, […] that the 
transferee, who is not party to such an agreement, is not bound by collective 
agreements subsequent to the one which was in force at the time of the transfer of 
the business. (Werhof, para 37, emphasis is mine). 
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the new employer would be bound not only by the terms of collective 
agreements at the time of the transfer, but also to subsequent collective 
agreements.73 The question which the national court74 referred to the CJEU 
then was whether national courts were free to apply those more favourable 
provisions of the national implementing legislation.75 The national court 
expressly stated that there was no contention that such national legislation 
breached the rights of the employer to freedom of association, as protected 
by Article 11 ECHR. 
The CJEU pointed out that the 'dynamic clause', was 'liable to limit 
considerably the room for manoeuvre necessary for a private transferee' to 
make adjustments to the conditions of employment to reflect 'the inevitable 
difference in working conditions that exist between [the public sector and 
the private sector]'.76 It would also require the employer to be bound by a 
contractual process to which it was not a party, where it could: 
neither assert its interests effectively in a contractual process nor negotiate 
the aspects determining changes in working conditions for its employees 
with a view to its future economic activity.77 
Therefore, the CJEU concluded that the requiring the employer to be bound 
by the 'dynamic clause' would be 'liable to adversely affect the very essence of 
its freedom to conduct a business'.78 
                                                 
73 Alemo-Herron (n 67), para 8. 
74 The matter was referred from the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom. 
75 The CJEU had held in Hernandez that the grant of more extensive protection than 
provided for in a Directive was a matter that fell outside the scope of EU law (Case 
C-198/13 Víctor Hernández and Others v Reino de España and Others, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2055). 
76 Alemo-Herron (n 67), para 28. 
77 ibid para 34. 
78 ibid para 35. 
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This judgment received extensive criticism, in particular for its treatment of 
the Acquired Rights Directive79 and for its treatment of the CJEU's own case 
law,80 and for the intrusion into the autonomy of labour law.81 
I will not address those aspects specifically, but will instead make two distinct 
but related arguments. First, in Alemo-Herron, the CJEU interpreted the right 
to conduct business so as to prohibit a member state from doing something 
which, but for that right, would be lawful under both national law and EU law. 
Second, the approach of the CJEU to freedom to conduct business entails an 
understanding of freedom as non-interference. 
2. Prohibiting That Which Is Allowed by National Law 
The referring court in Alemo Herron had itself indicated that the right to 
freedom of association, as protected by the ECHR, was not in issue.82 
Further, the referring court, the UK's Supreme Court, had clearly stated that 
the domestic law was 'entirely consistent with the common law principle of 
freedom of contract'83 and: 
There can be no objection in principle to parties including a term in their 
contract that the employee's pay is to be determined from time to time by a 
third party such as the NJC of which the employer is not a member or on 
which it is not represented. 84 
                                                 
79 J. Prassl 'Freedom of contract as a general principle of EU law? Transfers of 
undertakings and the protection of employer rights in EU labour law' (2013) 42 
Industrial Law Journal 434 (esp. 439 – 440). 
80 Weatherill (n 41); X. Groussot and G. T. Petursson, 'The Emergence of a New 
Constitutional Framework' in S. de Vries, U. Bernitz and S.Weatherill (eds), The EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights as a binding instrument (Hart 2015), 142-143. 
81 Prassl (n 79), Syrpis and T. Novitz, 'The EU Internal Market and Domestic Labour 
Law: Looking Beyond Autonomy' in A. Bogg and others (eds) The Autonomy of Labour 
Law (Hart 2015). 
82 Alemo-Herron (n 67), para 19. 
83 Parkwood Leisure Ltd v Alemo-Herron and others [2011] UKSC 26, para 9 (per Lord 
Hope). 
84 ibid. 
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And as the Advocate General pointed out, the parties in the proceedings had 
indicated to the CJEU that the UK system of collective bargaining is 
characterised by its flexibility, and UK labour law:  
does not appear to preclude Parkwood and the employees of the transferred 
undertaking sitting down to negotiate and agreeing to dispense with, amend 
or preserve the clause. 
So according to the referring court, the national legislation did not violate 
national principles of private law, nor was it in any other way invalid as 
national legislation. Therefore Parkwood Leisure, according to national law, 
did not have the right not to abide by the collective agreement. 
3. Prohibiting That Which Is Allowed by EU Law 
As indicated above, the Directive, read in isolation, did not prohibit member 
states from granting more extensive protection to employee's right following 
transfer than stipulated in the Directive. Further, in its Preamble the 
Directive states that its objectives are a) reducing differences between 
member states in respect of employee protection following transfer and b) 
ensure that the rights of employees are protected in the event of transfer. 
So on the face of it, the national legislation did not contravene the Directive, 
nor could it be considered to undermine the expressly stated objectives of the 
Directive. This is in contrast to situations such as Laval85 In that case, the 
Swedish law granted the workers more extensive protection than required 
under the Posted Workers Directive86, but in so doing it restricted the 
freedom to provide services of Laval.87 This Directive is expressly stated to be 
a measure intended to further the integration of the single market, and any 
national measure which restricts one of the fundamental freedoms will 
inevitably contradict the objectives of the Directive.88 Alemo-Herron entails 
an extension of the scope of application of the Charter also in comparison to 
                                                 
85 Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet and others, 
ECLI:EU:C:2007:809. 
86 Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 
1996 concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services 
[1997] OJ L18/1. 
87 Laval (n 85) para. 99.  
88 Posted Workers Directive (n 86), Recitals 1 and 2. 
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Scarlet Extended and Netlog.89 In those cases the national measure contravened 
an express provision of the Directive, and undermined an express objective 
of the Directive. They therefore fell clearly within the scope of EU law.  
4. The Transformation of the Right to Conduct Business 
So why should the CJEU have the power to review national measures 
implementing a Directive which provide more extensive protection and 
which do not otherwise obstruct the achievement of the objectives of that 
Directive? As Bartl and Leone emphasise, whilst this would appear to 
represent an extension of the scope of the CJEU's power of review member 
state measures, neither the judgment nor the AG's Opinion indicate the 
reason for such an extension of the CJEU's power.90 
But the CJEU does state that the objective of the Directive is not merely to 
protect the rights of employees, in the event of a transfer, but 'seeks to ensure 
a fair balance between the interests of those employees, on the one hand, and 
those of the transferee, on the other'.91 The relevant interest of the transferee 
is the interest in having 'room for manoeuvre in order to make necessary 
adjustments and changes to the contractual relationship with its employees. 
In other words, the relevant interest that needs to be balanced against the 
employees' interests is the freedom of contract of the employer. 
I argue that, in presenting Article 16 as protecting the 'room for manoeuvre' 
of Parkwood, the CJEU interpreted the right to conduct business as 
                                                 
89 Discussed above (n 57). 
90 M. Bartl and C. Leone 'Minimum Harmonisation after Alemo-Herron: The Janus Face 
of EU Fundamental Rights Review' (2015) 11 European Constitutional Law Review 
140. 
91 Alemo-Herron (n 67), para. 25. This 'teleological twist' has been criticized on several 
grounds. Prassl points out that it appears to go against the text of the Directive – 
according to Prassl the Directive was never designed internally to balance the 
interests of the employer and employee, but was intended to protect employees in 
light of structural changes in the employment market - changes brought about in part 
through the processes of European market integration (Prassl (n 79)). Weatherhill 
claims that this interpretation misses the 'thematic rationale' of protecting the 
weaker parties in contractual relationships which is prevalent in much of EU 
secondary law, in fields such as employment rights and consumer protection 
(Weatherill (n 41)).  
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protecting freedom as non-interference, rather than freedom as non-
domination. On the later interpretation, Parkwood would have no right not 
to comply with the contractual clause to which it had signed up. Its right to 
conduct business was limited to the freedom to conduct business 'in 
accordance with EU law, and with national laws and practices'. 
However, by re-interpreting Article 16 as protecting the right of Parkwood 
to that which national law expressly precluded it from doing, the CJEU 
transformed the freedom to conduct business. It transformed from the 
freedom to do that which the law allows, to the right to challenge the law 
where such law interferes with the freedom of choice of the undertaking. 
V. THE IMPLICATIONS OF PROTECTING FREEDOM AS NON-
INTERFERENCE 
Stephen Weatherill suggested that Alemo-Herron was a decision so 
'downright odd' that it deserves to be 'consigned to the bottom of an icy lake' 
and forgotten about. It is, as I have argued above, and as Weatherill so lucidly 
demonstrates, a decision that is clearly out of line with the previous 
jurisprudence of the Court. It has also not been followed in subsequent 
rulings.92 It may therefore appear wiser, for those troubled by its 
implications, to leave it to fall into obscurity at the bottom of that lake. 
However, the aim of this article is not solely a critique of the specific decision 
in Alemo-Herron. Rather, this article seeks to problematize the particular 
conception of freedom which is presupposed by Alemo-Herron, and which has 
been advanced not just in that decision, but also in discussions concerning the 
meaning of Article 16. In particular, the Fundamental Rights Agency of the 
EU has produced a report on the freedom to conduct business that ties 
Article 16 to the need to 'reshape Europe's approach to free enterprise' 'by 
creating a business-friendly environment at the national level' and by 
                                                 
92 At the time of writing, the judgment had not been cited by the CJEU in connection 
with the interpretation of Article 16 (in Case C-328/13 Österreichischer 
Gewerkschaftsbund v Wirtschaftskammer Österreich, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2197) the CJEU 
cited the case in connection with the Transfer of Undertakings Directive, and in Case 
C-456/13 T & L Sugars Ltd and Sidul Açúcares Unipessoal Lda v European Commission, 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:284, in connection with the interpretation of Article 47 of the 
Charter).  
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'spurring the economy by simplifying for entrepreneurship and business to 
operate'. 93 On a similar vein, Usai proposes that a greater recognition of the 
right to conduct business would lead to more economic freedom and 
therefore to greater welfare – it would push the throttle in favour of an even 
more developed economic union, and Leczykiewicz suggests that the right to 
conduct business 'offers private parties more concrete and entrenched 
mechanisms of resisting regulatory effects of national and EU law'. Advocate 
General Trsternjak, in her Opinion in the Fra.Bo even implied that a private 
entity could rely on Article 16 to challenge (otherwise lawful) measures aimed 
at ensuring free movement.94 
Additionally, the language of the CJEU in obiter dicta in recent cases seems to 
echo an understanding of the freedom to conduct business as freedom from 
interference. In UPC Telekabel Wien the CJEU stated that '[t]he freedom to 
conduct a business includes, inter alia, the right for any business to be able to 
freely use, within the limits of its liability for its own acts, the economic, 
technical and financial resources available to it'. 95 This idea of the right to 
conduct business as entailing a freedom from regulatory burdens, as freedom 
from interference, seems therefore to have some traction in the discussions 
concerning Article 16. It appears both logical and appealing – who can object 
to the right of individuals to make their own choices in life.  
But if we recall the republican critique of freedom as non-interference 
outlined above, we realise that freedom does not consist of not having one's 
choices interfered with, it consists of not being in a position where others 
have control over us when we make choices. So if we take the case of Alemo-
                                                 
93 FRA 'Freedom to Conduct Business – Exploring the dimensions of a Fundamental 
Right (EU Commission, Report, 2015), at http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2015/ 
freedom-conduct-business-exploring-dimensions-fundamental-right accessed 21 
September 2016. 
94 Opinion of AG Trsternjak in Case C‑171/11 Fra.bo SpA v Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- 
und Wasserfaches, ECLI:EU:C:2012:176, para 56. 
95 Case C-314/12 UPC Telekabel Wien GmbH v Constantin Film Verleih GmbH and another, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:192, para 49. But the CJEU held that any right of the company to 
conduct its business was not affected by the injunction at issue. This phrasing was 
repeated recently in Case C-134/15 Lidl GmbH & Co. KG v Freistaat Sachsen, 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:498, para 27, but the CJEU held that the EU measure did not 
breach the applicant's freedom to conduct business. 
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Herron, we can see that what is at stake is not just the freedom of the employer 
and of the employees to choose the terms of their contract of employment, 
but the fact that in a scenario where employers and employees have such 
freedom of choice, the employer might well be in a dominant position, and so 
be able to exercise alien control over the employees.96 In other words, those 
employees will only be seen as free if we conceive of freedom as non-
interference. If we conceive of freedom as non-domination, then where the 
employer is in a dominant position, the freedom of choice for the employees 
may be seen as no freedom at all. Indeed, as Weatherill and other 
commentators point out, 97 a range of EU legislation, not only in labour law, 
but also in consumer law and anti-discrimination law, can be understood as 
an attempt to protect the weaker party in situations where untrammelled 
freedom of choice would leave that weaker party vulnerable. The Acquired 
Rights Directive itself appeared (before its reinterpretation by the Court in 
Alemo-Herron) to be a measure intended to protect employees who found 
themselves in a particularly vulnerable situation following the take-over of 
their employer by another company. 
But my argument does not stop there. As set out above, the republican 
critique of freedom as non-interference is double edged. Not only does it fail 
to account for loss of freedom in situations of non-interference, but also fails 
to account for interference which does not entail loss of freedom. 
Considering again Alemo-Herron, it may appear that the domestic legislation 
restricts the employer's freedom, by interfering with their freedom to choose 
the terms of their contract with their employees. But that legislation, 
assuming that it was the outcome of a reasonably democratic process over 
which both employees and employers had some measure of control,98 did not 
restrict the employer's freedom as it was not a result of alien control. 
                                                 
96 For an exploration of the freedom of association of trade unions from a perspective 
of republican political theory, see A. Bogg and C Estlund 'Freedom of Association 
and the Right to Contest' in A. Bogg et al (eds.) The Autonomy of Labour Law (Oxford: 
Hart, 2015). 
97 Weatherill (n 41), 174; Bartl and Leone (n 90), 144, Prassl (n 79), 439).  
98 Although the TUPE Regulations are a Statutory Instrument, rather than an Act of 
Parliament, they are made by the Secretary of State under powers delegated by an Act 
of Parliament, and subject to parliamentary scrutiny (as well as judicial review on, 
inter alia, ultra vires grounds). Further, as the Explanatory Memorandum to the 
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However, in requiring the national court to set aside the domestic legislation 
in order to extend the freedom of choice of the employers, the Court 
effectively diminished the public autonomy of the UK, and in so doing, 
diminished the freedom of persons in the UK. As I set out above, if individual 
members of the community are able to arbitrarily disregard the rules by which 
that community regulate their life together, and thereby exercise domination 
over other members of the community, then no member of that community 
is able to consider her or himself as a free person. 
The objection might be made that the rules were not set aside arbitrarily. EU 
law claims primacy over national law, and requiring the UK to set aside its 
laws where they conflict with EU law is merely an expression of that. But, 
under a republican conception of freedom, we can see the obligations which 
member states take under the Treaties, such as the obligation to allow free 
movement in the internal market, as being obligations that are undertaken by 
the political community as a whole, and over which that community has some 
control. Similarly, the demand that member states implement the obligations 
imposed by EU Secondary Law are not arbitrary if we assume99 that the 
legislative processes of the EU are ones over which those affected are able to 
exercise some measure of control.100  
By contrast, the Court in Alemo-Herron determined that the national 
legislation should be set aside because it was wrong – because it was 'liable to 
adversely affect the very essence of [the employer's] freedom to conduct a 
business'.101 This assumes that there is an objective 'essence' to economic 
                                                 
Regulations state, these Regulations were years in the making, in a process in which 
a broad range of both employer and employee organizations were consulted 
(Explanatory Memorandum to TUPE Regulations 2006 (2006/246), paragraph 7.1, 
available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2006/246/memorandum/contents, 
accessed 21 September 2016).  
99 As Pettit points out, the republican ideal of freedom as non-domination assumes that 
those subject to the law have some measure of control over that law, even if this is 
only to a limited extent (Pettit (n 7), 139).  
100 This of course is a matter in respect of which there is significant disagreement. But I 
suggest that the wide margin of discretion which the Court affords the EU legislature 
stems (at least in part) from the recognition of the greater democratic legitimacy of 
the EU legislature vis à vis the Court. 
101 Alemo-Herron (n 67), para 35. 
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freedom, and that it is possible for the Court to identify it. But what the 
'essence' of any right to conduct business might be, if such an essence exists 
at all, is a question of considerable disagreement. This disagreement is 
reflected both in the litigation that took place at national level,102 and in 
proposals for legislative reform,103 which preceded the Court of Justice's 
judgment.104 By constitutionalizing the right of participants in the market to 
be free of regulatory interference, except to the extent that this can be 
justified,105 the CJEU is making a particular determination of the relationship 
between the market and the state, and the role of the state in regulating the 
market.106 By making that determination in a way which fails to acknowledge 
the disagreements that surround it, and the resulting need for political 
                                                 
102 For an overview of that litigation, see, e.g. C. Wynn-Evans, 'TUPE, Collective 
Agreements and the Static–Dynamic Debate: Alemo-Herron and Others v Parkwood 
Leisure Ltd [2010] IRLR 298, CA (2010) 39 Industrial Law Journal 275 
103 The 2006 Regulations were introduced by the Labour government, and were 
criticized by the conservative opposition. When the Coalition government came to 
power they proposed reform of the 2006 Regulations (see iCroner 'Amendments to 
the TUPE Regulations 2006' 31 January 2014, at: https://app.croner.co.uk/feature-
articles/reform-tupe-regulations?product=29#WKID-201401071444350299-
25691899, accessed on 21 September 2016.  
104 Not to mention the barrage of criticism that the judgment received after it was 
handed down. And it should be remembered that the Advocate General, in his 
interpretation of the right to conduct business, did not consider that the UK 
legislation breached the essence of that right (Opinion of AG Cruz Villalon in Case 
C-426/11 Mark Alemo-Herron and others v Parkwood Leisure Ltd ECLI:EU:C:2013:82). 
105 For a criticism of EU political choices which favour distributive justice and collective 
welfare over personal freedom and market economy, see Herresthal (n 42), 114. This 
leads Herresthal to call for stronger EU mechanisms against the undue restriction of 
the later (102) and specifically to propose that the CJEU 'make an effort to provide 
for substantiation of freedom of contract' and to refer less to the ECtHR caselaw and 
more to the Charter (116).  
106 Poiares Maduro highlights the choice entailed in different concepts of the European 
economic constitution, by reference to the Treaty provisions on free movement of 
goods. One concept sees this freedom as aimed at preventing protectionism and 
barriers to trade between member states, and the other concept sees this freedom as 
an 'economic due process' clause that would allow the CJEU to review any kind of 
intervention in the market (M. Poiares Maduro We the Court: the European Court of 
Justice and the European economic constitution (Hart, 1998), 60).  
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mechanisms to resolve them, the Court risks becoming itself a source of 
domination.107  
VI. CONCLUSION 
I have argued that 'freedom' need not only be conceived as non-interference, 
but can also be conceived as non-domination. I suggested that there are very 
good reasons why a right to conduct business should be understood - as the 
text of Article 16, and the pre-Charter case law of the Court, would suggest – 
as freedom from domination. What the right to conduct business protects is 
the freedom to conduct business in accordance with EU law and national laws 
and practices, and not the freedom not be interfered with in the conduct 
business. 
But in Alemo-Herron the Court appears to have departed from this 
understanding of Article 16. By protecting the right of Parkwood Ltd not to 
be interfered with by the (otherwise valid) national Regulation the Court 
reinterpreted Article 16 as protecting freedom from national law and 
practices.  
I argued that there are grave implications in such a reinterpretation. If we 
understand freedom as non-domination, such reinterpretation will result in 
the loss of freedom of those who become subject to domination by others, 
and the loss of freedom of the political community to determine its common 
life together. 
                                                 
107 Richard Bellamy argues that any attempt to delineate matters which are to be 
insulated from politics, and a failure to acknowledge disagreement in respect of those 
matters can itself be a source of domination and arbitrary rule (R. Bellamy Political 
Constitutionalism (CUP 2007), 147 ff.). 
